The First War Israel Lost

by Samuel Z. Anvil

At the beginning of this latest chapter in Israel’s resistance to the global jihad – and let’s not be naïve: this war began with Mohammed’s conquest of Mecca fourteen hundred years ago and will continue until either there are no more infidels or no more Moslems – Nasrallah ridiculed Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and IDF Chief-of-Staff Dan Halutz as beginners, too inexperienced to outsmart the wily Nasrallah. Olmert’s impassioned speech to the Knesset a few days later, in which he set forth the country’s goals in the war and promised to fundamentally change the balance of power in the region, suggested that Nasrallah had miscalculated.

A month later, it looks like it was Olmert who miscalculated: he badly overestimated his own abilities to deliver on his promises. He is, after all, merely a well-oiled backroom politician who rose to his present position thanks to his skills in fighting the “wars of the Jews” – the endless internal squabbles of Israeli politics – and thanks too to the timing of Ariel Sharon’s stroke. His wife and daughter are prominent opponents of the political ideals he claims to represent, his sons did not bother to serve in the IDF, and his own IDF service consisted of writing for the puffy monthly Bamachene. He is no Winston Churchill.

Nasrallah may have been surprised by the initial ferocity of Olmert’s response to Hizballah’s kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, but he was not surprised by Olmert the man. Only the Israeli public was. Ever the weak-kneed politician, Olmert hesitated when he should have acted decisively, leapt in headfirst when he should have hesitated, in the end betrayed every one of the principles he vowed to fight for, and will surely claim a hollow victory in the face of abject defeat.

Some unanswered questions for Olmert:
· Why, despite repeated warnings by commanders in the field that the site of the kidnapping was an easily-exploitable blind spot, did the IDF continue to send useless patrols to that spot? Was there anything that these patrols were supposed to achieve that could not have been achieved equally well by a camera-equipped drone, or was it the IDF’s intent to lure Hizballah into a trap? And if so, who trapped whom?
· Why, when every child knows that Hizballah had massively mined the roads in South Lebanon – Nasrallah made no secret of it and many times proclaimed that Israeli tanks would be lured to their destruction – did the IDF send a tank (a slow moving tank!) in pursuit of the kidnappers, who everyone knew were long gone from the area and already out of reach?
· Why did the IDF bombing begin immediately? Why were no delaying tactics – for example, ultimatums and high-pressure diplomatic efforts – employed to give the IDF time to properly prepare the offensive? Did Olmert think Nasrallah was still setting at his desk, being interviewed by Mike Wallace, in the range of the IDF’s missiles? Did no one know about the Hizballah’s huge network of well-fortified bunkers?
· Why did Olmert bombastically declare that Israel would seek very ambitious goals, and did he base his confidence that these goals would be achieved on the assumption that the Lebanese people would get rid of Hizballah, that the Lebanese government, beholden as it is to Syria, would sacrifice Lebanese soldiers for the benefit of Israel?
· Why was the IDF unable, even after a month, to take Hizballah television and radio off the air? Should not this failure have suggested to the IDF that the Hizballah was very well prepared for this war, even if they were surprised by the timing?
· Why did Olmert ignore the simple truth that terrorist organizations are defeated only when they are totally defeated, not when they are only 90% or 80% defeated? Did he really expect that an air campaign would totally defeat Hizballah: kill every one of their soldiers, blow up every one of their bunkers and dry up every penny of their financing? Didn’t Olmert understand that all their losses – people and buildings and dollars – would be replaced within a year?
· Why did Olmert back down from every one of his declared goals? The prisoners have not been returned, Hizballah is still alive and well with all its weapons, still entrenched in the south, and the world order has not been changed in the slightest, except to Israel’s disadvantage.

Some unanswered questions for Olmert’s predecessors:
· Why was Hizballah allowed the luxury of six years to leisurely build its infrastructure? Were successive Israeli governments unaware of what Hizballah was doing, what it was preparing for? Was nobody listening when Nasrallah was talking? He spoke often and explicitly about his “hopes and dreams.” Did no one believe he was serious?
· Why was the lesson of “one sided concessions only make thing worse” learned only after the disengagement from Gaza? Was the withdrawal from Lebanon so successful that the Israeli government viewed it as a model for the future?

And finally, some unanswered questions for Olmert’s successor, who will probably take up office very soon:
· Mr. Prime Minister, since Hizballah has declared it will go on fighting as long as a single Israeli soldier remains in Lebanon – its commitment to the cease fire being restricted to firing missiles into Israel – how will Israel respond to the inevitable attacks on its soldiers while they wait to be replaced by the promised multi-national force?
· Do you really believe that the multi-national force or the Lebanese Army will fire a single bullet and endure a single casualty in pursuit of their commitment to disarm Hizballah? What will Israel do a few months from now, when it becomes clear to everyone – except perhaps to Shimon Peres – that Hizballah is staying right where it is, missiles and all, and that the international community is going to do absolutely nothing about it?
· The lesson the jihadis will learn from this war is that though Israel cannot be defeated by a conventional army of tanks, planes and infantry mounting a large scale invasion, Israel can be defeated by an entrenched irregular force which (1) fires missiles into Israeli cities, killing large numbers of civilians and doing massive damage to infrastructure, (2) lures Israeli soldiers into enemy territory in pursuit and kills large numbers of them with mines and hand-held anti-tank missiles, (3) enlists the aid of the main stream media – whether by threats or by just taking advantage of their built-in anti-Israel bias – to ensure the perception of a high number of “innocent civilian” casualties that will bring international pressure to bear, (4) retreats to a network of heavily fortified bunkers when threatened and (5) violates with impunity all agreements made to end the hostilities. The question: Mr. Prime Minister, our enemies have learned this lesson; have you?
· Will you also apply the lesson to the failed Gaza campaign?
· What will you do to restore the IDF’s image as a strong fighting force, the best in the world as some say?
· How will you restore Israel’s credibility with the US, which must surely be disappointed at the IDF’s defeat by Hizballah and regret its own support for the failed effort?

And finally, let’s not forget our kidnapped soldiers, even if the Israeli government has forgotten them.

In the end, the IDF underestimated Hizballah and the Israeli public overestimated Olmert and Halutz. The long knives will be coming out soon, and one can only hope that the smoke-filled back-rooms of Israeli politics will produce better leadership for the inevitable next round of this fourteen hundred year long war.